Abstracts of Recent Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The rules of pleading require from a plaintiff, as a pre-requisite
to a judgment in his behalf, an allegation that he has suffered
damage, together with his estimate as to the extent thereof. Con-
ceding that this declaration furnishes foundation for the inference
that the plaintiff has been injured to the extent of the money paid
out, yet the pleader has not averred such to be the fact in language
of which the court can take notice. Upon this point nothing is to
be left to inference. Saying that the plaintiff has paid a sum of
money which it was the duty of the defendant to pay, is not in
pleading the equivalent for an allegation that he has suffered
damage to a specified amount.
It is true that the sum named in the ad damnum clause is not
that for which, if for any sum, the plaintiff is of necessity to have
a judgment; it is subject to modification by a specific statement in
the declaration, or by a bill of particulars filed by order of court;
but in the total absence of the clause the plaintiff has failed to ask
the court for a judgment for any sum; he has failed to aver that
he has suffered a wrong which it is within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Common Pleas to redress. There is no living thing into
which to graft an amendment; he has failed to be in court at all.
There is no error in the judgment.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT.1
ENGLISH COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITYo
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.4
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 6
ACTION.
Pleadings against Person in one capacity, and Proof against him in
another.-The defendant had been factorized as an executor, the debt
attached being a legacy given by the will. Judgment having been ob.
From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 47 Conn. Reports.
t Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
S From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 96 Illinois Reports.
4 From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter; to appear in 52 Iowa Reports.
3 From A. Wilson Norris, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 90 Penn. St. Repert.
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tained in the suit, and the defendant not paying as garnishee on demand,
the plaintiff brought a writ of scire facias against him in Iis individ-
ual capacity, and making demand on him only in that capacity, but
setting out the factorizing proceedings in the declaratory part of the
writ. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice that he
should offer evidence of certain facts with regard to the condition of
the estate. Held:
1. That judgment could not be rendered against the defendant in his
individual capacity, because the facts alleged did not show a liability in
that capacity.
2. That judgment could not be rendered against him as an executor,
because he was sued only in his individual capacity.
3. That the notice given under the general issue, of matters pertain.
ing only to his liability as executor, was not sufficient to warrant a
judgment against him as executor: Middlebrook v. Pendleton, 47 Conn
AGENT.
Ratification-PromissoryNote.-A principal who accepts and attempts
to enforce a note taken in his name by an assumed agent cannot deny
the agency of the latter in the transaction out of which the note grew:
Farrar & Wheeler v. Peterson, 52 Iowa.
ASSIGNMENT. See Bills and Notes.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Agent; Husband and Wife.
Draft-Assignment of Fund-Intention.-A bill of exchange drawn
upon a general fund, and not accepted by the drawee, does not operate
as an assignment of the fund, but is merely evidence to be considered
with other circumstances in determining the intention of the parties:
First Nat. Bank of Canton v. Dubugue Southwestern Railway Co., 52
Iowa.
Evidence considered and held insufficient to show that a draft was
intended as an assignment to the holder of a fund subsequently coming
into the hands of the drawee: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Eminent Domain-Mode of taking Property.-The mode of taking
private property for public use by municipal corporations is in the con-
trol of the legislature, subject only to the limitations of the constitu-
tion: Bchler's Appeal; In re Openinq of Walnut Street, 90 Penn. St.
Section 8, article 16, of the Constitution secures an appeal and trial
by jury for damages, wherever private property is taken by a municipal
corporation for public use, and the Act of June 18th 1874, furnishes
the remedy thus secured to owners where no sufficient provision for
trial by jury already existed - Id.
CONTEMPT.
SSuffciency of Judgment-Power to review Judgment of CommittalZ-Habeas Corpus.-A judgment or order of court, that a defendant stand
committed to the county jail until the further order of the court, and
awarding a mittimus for that purpose, for a contempt in refusing to obey
a previous order of the court that be surrender books, &c., in his hands
as receiver, to his successor, is illegal and void, and will not justify the
imprisonment of the defendant: The People, ex rel. Hinkley v. Pirfen.
brink, 96 Ills
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. 787
If a committal for a contempt of court is for a definite period, or until
the defendant shall perform a specified act, the judgment will be capa-
ble of being reviewed on error, but when the order of commitment isuntil the further order or the court., the appellate court cannot know the
duration of the imprisonment and determine whether the confinement
is reasonable, or is oppressive and wrong: Id.
If an order of commitment for a contempt of court is simply erro-neous, this court has no power to discharge the prisoner on habeas corpus.
In such case error or appeal is the only remedy, but it is otherwise when
the judgment and process are void : Id.
Thus, where an order and mittimus for the imprisonment of a partywere not for any definite period, or until he should perfbrm some actrequired of him, it was held, that the order and process were too indefi-
nite, and were void, and the prisoner was discharged : Id.
All judgments must be specific and certain. They must determinethe rights recovered or the penalties imposed, and be such as the defend-ant may readily understand and be capable of performing: Td.
CONTRACT.
illegal Consideration- Compounding Oriminal Offence.-A manhaving been arrested and lodged in jail upon a criminal prosecution
against himself and his son, for obtaining goods under false pretences,
his wife agreed with the parties ftom whom the goods were obtained
and who had procured the prosecution, that she would give a note withher husband for the value of the goods and for the costs made, and
secure it by a mortgage of' her real estate, if they would procure theabandonment of the criminal proceeding and the release of her husband.
The note and mortgage were given and the prosecution was withdrawn.
Meld, on a bill to foreclose the mortgage, that a court of equity wouldnot enforce a contract of' suretyship so procured. The note was void asbeing upon an illegal consideration: McMahon v. Smith, 47 Conn.
To render such an agreement void it is not necessary that the crimecompounded should be a felony. It is enough if it be a public offence:
CORPORATION.
Powers to Contract-Ultra Vires.-The doctrine of ultra vires asexplained in The Asbury Railway Co. v. Riche, Law Rep., 7 H. L. 63,is to be maintained, but is to be applied reasonably, so that whatever isfairly incidental to those things which the legislature has authorized by
an Act of Parliament, ought not (unless expressly prohibited) to beheld as ultra vires: Attorney- General v. Great Eastern Railway Co.,
Law Rep., 5 App. Cases.
In an act granting special powers, what is not permitted is prohibited:
Id.
Subscription to Stock-Cash Payment-Conditional Subscriptionsbefore Charter.-Where an act provides that where subscriptions aremade to the capital stock of a railway company, previous to the issueof letters patent, no subscription shall be valid, unless the party making
the same shall, at the time of subscribing, pay $5 on each and everyshare for the use of the company. -Held, that giving a note for a sub-scription was not a payment within the meaning of the law: Boyd v.
Peach Bottom Railway Co. 90 Penn. St.
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Held, further, that such a subscriber, who had taken no other part in
the affairs of the company, was not estopped from setting up the absence
of such payment as a defence to an action of assumpsit for the subscrip-
tion : Id.
A subscription to the stock of a public corporation, made before
letters patent are issued and an organization effected, must be considered
absolute and unqualified, and any condition attached thereto is void.
Commissioners have no authority to raise conditional subscriptions. If
they do, the subscription is valid and binding, and the condition null
and void: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Contract.
EVidence--Judicial Eotice of Time of Sunset-Almanac-Burglqry.
-Upon a trial for burglary, the state was allowed to introduce an
almanac for the purpose of showing when the sun set on the day on
which the crime was committed. Held to be no error. The matter
was one of which the court would have taken judicial notice, and the
almanac was received, not strictly as evidence, but to refresh the
memory of the court and jury: State v. Morris, 47 Conn.
It will not avail a prisoner on a charge of burglary that there was
light enough from the moon, street-lights, and lights of buildings, aided
by newly-fallen snow, to enable one person to discern the features of
another. There must have been daylight enough left for the pur-
pose: Id.
Where the crime charged was burglary committed by the prisoner
when so armed as to indicate violent intentions, it was held that the fact
that the prisoner was so armed when he left the house where the bur-
glary was committed, was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in find-
ing that he was so armed when he committed the crime: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Surety.
DRAFT. See Bills and Notes.
EQUITY. See Contract.
Pleading-Allegations and Proof-Material Allegations only need be
Proved.-It is not essential to support a decree in favor of a com-
•plainant that all the allegations of the bill be proved precisely as
charged. All that the law requires is that the material allegations shall
be substantially proved: Allen et al. v. Woodriff et al, 96 Ill.
If the actual facts are stated correctly in a bill, which is all the law
requires, -allegations in respect to what the pleader supposes to be the
legal effect of such facts, Which'proves entirely erroneous, will not con-
clude or prejudice the complainant. His rights depend upon the actual
facts stated, and not upon the erroneous conclusions of the pleader with
respect to them: Id.
Where.the actual facts are correctly stated in a bill and proved, it is
the duty of the court to render such decree and grant such relief as
the law requires from such facts, without regard to the theory of the
pleader in framing the bill: Id.
EVIDENCE. See Uriminal Law; Husband and Wife.
FIXTURES.
Bill of Sale-Mortgage of Stone Quarry.-T ramways and Steam
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Crane.-By a deed of mortgage of a stone quarry the quarry was granted,
together with the mills, buildings, steam engines, motive power, plant,
fixed and moveable machinery, apparatus, rails, sleepers, implements,
fittings, and fixtures of every description, then or at any time thereafter
fixed to, or placed upon the hereditaments; all in the same witnessing
part. At the date of the mortgage there was a tramway in the quarry,
and there was also a steam crane, cramped on to large stones, and kept
in position by two guys. Held, that the tramway and crane were fix-
tures, and that the mortgage did not require registration either under
the Bills of Sale Act, in order to give the mortgagee the right to retain
the tramways and crane as part of his security, as against a liquidation
trustee: Ex. parte Moore & Robinson's Banking Co., In re Armytage,
Law Rep., 14 (han. Div.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Express Trusts.-In all cases where a. deed or other instrument of
conveyance is absolute on its face, and the grantor or his assignee seeks
to defeat its operation by showing that the deed, though absolute in
form, was, in fact, executed upon certain express trusts, the grantee
may invoke the protection of the Statute of Frauds by requiring proof
of these alleged trusts to be made in writing but the statute was not
enacted for the benefit of those seeking to defeat the operation of such
deeds by showing that they were made upon trusts not appearing upon
their face-only for those claiming title under them: Allen v. Wood-
ruff, 96 Il1.
GARNISHMENT. See Judgment.
GROWING CROPS. See Real and Personal Property.
HABEAS CORPUS. See Contempt.
HIGHWAY. See ffunicipal Corporation.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
.Afarried Woman's Note-Must be shown to be within the Statute
Authorizing her to Contract-Declarations of Rusband.-Where a
married woman has signed a note with her husband, it will not be pre-
sumed, but must be shown, that the circumstances were such as to
bring the case within the statute making married women liable upon
their contracts: Way v. Peck et al., 47 Conn.
The declarations of the husband at the time the loan was made, as to
the object for which the money was borrowed, made to the lender, but
in the absence of the wife and without her authority, held not to be
binding on her : Id.
The fact that a part of the money loaned was deposited by the hus-
band in a bank to 'the credit of the wife, and drawn out by her in
payment of bills for an addition to her house, though significant as
evtdence that the loan was obtained for the benefit of herself or her
estate, yet held not to be equivalent to a finding that it was so in fact:
Id.
INSURANCE.
Matual-Surrender of Policy.-The by-laws of a mutual insurance
company provided that the liability of a member should continue, until
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the cancellation of his policy and the erasure of his name from the books
of the company. Held, that the company was relieved from liability
for a loss by fire after a voluntary surrender of his policy by a holder,
without a formal cancellation of the same and the erasure of his name
from the books of the company: Farmers' .Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wenger,
90 Penn. St.
INTEREST.
Mortgage of Reversionary Interests- Covenant for Compound In-
terest-Interest Capitalized.-A. and B., reversioners after a life-interest
in C., mortgaged their property and covenanted that interest in arrear
should be capitalized, and bear interest after the same rate; and C. also
assigned her life-interest as part of the security. Held, that the cove-
nant was good and valid; and that the mortgagee was not limited to
six years' interest: Clarkson v. Henderson, Law Rep., 14 Chan, Div.
JUDGMENT. See Contempt.
Purchase of ly Surety on 1njunction Bond- Garnishment.-A surety
upon an injunction bond, to restrain the collection of a judgment, is
not a party to the judgment in such sense that he cannot purchase it
after the injunction is dissolved, and an assignment thereof to him will
not operate as a payment and release the property of the judgment debtor
from the lien of the judgment, though the surety took indemnity when
he signed the bond: Davis v. Wilson et al., 52 Iowa.
A surety upon an injunction bond who took as indemnity a bill of
sale of certain chattels, was garnished under an attachment against his
principal. Held, that such attachment was valid and gave the creditor
a lien upon the proceeds of the property after indemnifying the surety.
It was not essential to the validity of the attachment that it should
appear that the debtor had no other property subject to attachment, or
that he was insolvent: Id.
LACHES. See Surety.
MORTGAGE. See Fixtures.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Defective Highway-Injury to Traveller-Negligence--Damages.-
The limit of duty on the part of a town with regard to the condition of
its highways, falls far short of making them absolutely safe under all cir-
cumstances, even for those who use them properly. And where the use
is one that reasonable care and prudence could never have anticipated
there is no duty on the town at all in reference to it: Wilson v. Granby,
47 Conn.
And it makes no difference that the injury in such a case is the result
of defects in a highway for which a town would be responsible in case
of injury to individuals in the lawful and proper use of it: Id.
Damages for an injury from a defect in a highway should be Qompen.
satory merely, unless the jury should find gross negligence on the part
of the town, in which case they may increase the amount by considering
the expenses of the plaintiff's suit, not including the taxable costs: Id.
NEGLIGNOCE. See Municipal Corporation.
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PARTNERSHIP.
S ettlement-impeachment of.-Where there has been an accounting
between partners, and neither fraud nor mistake affecting the whole
account as stated is shown, such account will be deemed correct except
as to such specific items as can be shown to be erroneous by the party
seeking to impeach the settlement: Hunter v. Aldrich, et aL, 52 Iowa.
Facts considered and held to render the books of account of a part-
nership admissible in evidence in an action between the partners: Ad.
PLEADING. See Equity.
RAILROAD.
Right of Way-Trespass.-A railway company which occupies with
its track, land over which it has not acquired the right of way is a
mere trespasser, and the purchaser of the land after such occupation
may maintain an action to recover the value of the land appropriated,
and the damages occasioned by the trespass since his purchase: Donald
v. St. L., K., . & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa.
REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE.
Growing Crops-Severance.-The purchaser of land at sheriff's sale
is entitled to the growing grain thereon which had not been severed
before a sale. If there has bees a severance it does not pass to him
who purchases the land subsequent to the severance: Hershey et al. v.
MAetzgar and Erug, 90 Penn. St.
The plaintiffs conveyed a farm to defendant and took a judgment for
part of the purchase-money. They issued a ft. fa. thereon and levied
on the real and personal estate. Defendant claimed his exemption and
elected to take the growing grain, which was duly appraised in the
presence of one of plaintiffs. The land was subsequently purchased by
the plaintiffs, who claimed that the growing grain passed to them.
Held, that the appraisement under these circumstances was a severance
of the grain and that plaintiffs were not entitled thereto : Id.
SALE.
Conditional-Estoppel of Vendor as against Vendee's Creditors -The
attorney of W. sold the one-half of a printing establishment and news-
paper to C., who at the time of the sale owned the other half. 0.
placed his name at the head of the paper as sole owner and assumed
exclusive possession and control thereof. The sale was made on condi-
tion that a part of the purchase-money should be paid in cash and the
balance in instalments. Before these instalments were all paid the pro-
perty was sold at sheriff's sale and bought by M., a creditor of C. No
claim to the property was made by W. at the time of the sale. There
was some evidence that C. had agreed to rescind the contract of sale,
which C. denied. The latter also at the time of the sale informed 1.
that he owned the property. W. filed a bill in equity to compel M to
account. Held, that it would not lie: Wylie's Appeal, 90 Penn. St.
Held, further, that under these circumstances the creditors of C.
would be led to believe that C.'s title was absolute and unconditional
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and that W. was estopped from setting up the conditions of the sale to
defeat that title in a contest with bonafide creditors : Id.
SHIPPING.
Deviation.- Charter-party.-A deviation for the purpose of saving
life is justifiable, but not a deviation for the mere purpose of saving
property. The defendants' ship was chartered by the plaintiffs to carry
a cargo of wheat from Cronstadt to the MIediterranean, the usual perils
of the sea excepted. Whilst on her voyage she sighted and went to
the assistance of" a vessel in distress, called the Arion, and the master,
in consideration of 10001., agreed to tow her into the Texel, which was
out of his direct course. Whilst so doing the defendants' vessel was
stranded, and ultimately (with her cargo) was totally lost. The jury
found that it was not reasonably necessary to take the Arion to the
Texel in order to save the lives of those on board her; but it was rea-
sonably necessary to do so in order to save her and her cargo. Held,
that the deviation was unjustifiable, and consequently that the plaintiffs
were entitled to recover the value of the cargo against the defendants
as owners of the ship: Scaramanga v. Stamp, Law. Rep., 5 C. P. Div.
SURETY. See Judgment.
Laches of Oredtor.-A., as principal, and B., as surety, executed
and delivered a bond to C. for $2000. Judgment was entered thereon
in 1862. In 1866 the amount of the judgment was paid to C., which
payment was made by A. appropriating moneys in his hands belonging
to his sisters-in-law. An assignment to them of the sum thus appro-
priated was endorsed on the bond, but the judgment was never marked
to their use, nor was the assignment filed. It did not appear affirma-
tively that the sisters ever had possession of the bond, or that they
knew that it'had been assigned to them. For some unexplained reason,
in 1866, the judgment was satisfied by C. The record thus remained
until 1877, when it was revived by an amicable scirefacias signed only
by A., who, having become embarrassed, made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors the following day. In 1878, in a scire facias on
the judgment, the sisters sought to recover from B., the surety. There
was evidence that he was misled by the record. Held, that as. they had
made no inquiry as to the disposition of their money for eleven years,
asserted no claim to the judgment and given no notice to the surety,
who was excused from vigilance by the action of C. and A., they could
not call on B. to make good the loss which, in legal contemplation, was
the consequence of their own default: Buffington, to ue of Mitchell, v.
.Ber'nard and Hfopes, 90 Penn. St.
Towx. See Municipal Corporation.
TRESPASS. See Railroad.
TRUST. See Frauds, Statute of.
ULTRA VIRES. See Corporation.
USURY. See Interest.
